Civil remedies allow an individual to coerce a third party into taking action against offenders who are imposing hardship on the individual initiating the remedy. Thus, a disjunction exists between the individual who initiates and benefits from a civil remedy and the entity that incurs most of the cost of implementing the remedy. The simplistic approach that government in a democratically society is supposed to serve the whole population's interests cannot be justified for civil remedies due to their very nature. If the actions taken by the third parties against the offenders are not cost-effective, the civil remedy as a whole cannot be cost-effective. Likewise, the civil remedy will not be cost-effective for society if what the plaintiff demands is not good for society. Actions to control drug problems usually reduce the quantity of drugs consumed; reduce the magnitude of the drug problem per kilogram consumed; or displace the problem from one location, time, and population to another. However, it is not obvious that the most common tactics that civil remedies coerce third parties to use (local drug law enforcement and shutting down dealing locations) are cost-effective at reducing drug use either in an absolute sense or relative to alternatives available to government agencies (conventional domestic enforcement and drug treatment for heavy drug users). It would seem less risky to encourage government agencies to seek civil remedies than to have private citizens do so, because a central concern is whether the plaintiff's interests are well-aligned with broader societal interests. Nevertheless, whether most civil remedies are cost-effective in practice is an open question; the best that can be done at present is to provide a framework for understanding and discussing the issues. Figure, notes, and 21 references (Author abstract modified)