This article identifies some of the pitfalls of the official approach to money laundering as set out by the European Financial Action Task Force report, as well as the lost opportunities for documenting the cross-border money flows in northwestern Europe. This paper also describes the relationship between crime money and the "upperworld" (legitimate economy), questions the magnitude of the supposed financial infiltration of organized crime, and notes some positive "spin-offs" from the investment of money from criminal enterprises in legitimate businesses. The author concludes that efforts to counter money laundering have not affected the crime markets appreciably, and it has created a new secondary crime market of secrecy services. Instead of focusing on money laundering, the author suggests that resources be used to assist police in targeting established crime entrepreneurs who have consolidated their market position. This can be significant, because even if it is futile to fight the crime market itself, the structure of the market can be weakened by targeting established market positions. Such a policy would fit with market-oriented, anti-laundering policy objectives. A crime entrepreneur can only consolidate by developing an economy of scale, which is not feasible without entering the financial "upperworld" and being a part of it. The financial investigator can thus detect complicated business structures that deviate from normal business practices, firms stuffed with too much foreign capital covered by questionable loans, expenditures skimming the profits to unknown foreign consultants, strange ownership by other companies, and other tricks. By recognizing money laundering as a strategy of organized crime, the effects of money laundering can be used to identify the criminal entrepreneurs. 18 notes and 21 references