After an article that provides an overview of the theme of the articles, the second article develops basic theoretical tools to describe the building blocks of various up-and-running sentencing structures, with attention to the permutations of discretions that contribute to sentencing outcomes. The third article posits a variety of objectives for sentencing commissions during "three strikes" debates, arguing that sentencing commissions have little reason to oppose these laws absolutely, but commissions do have incentives to argue for limiting the scope of "three strikes" statutes. The fourth article focuses on the role of sentencing commissions as centers of policy analysis during State budget processes; also discussed is an important stage for policy research, i.e., the evaluation of alternative policies by means of computer simulation, a modeling tool often used by sentencing commissions. Following a discussion of computer simulation principles, several prominent simulation models used by sentencing commissions are reviewed, and the activities of Virginia's sentencing commission shows how commissions serve as policy research centers. The fifth article argues that if the rule of law were brought to bear on sentencing decisions, it would not just permit, it would require, different penal sanctions to be imposed when offenders are found to differ in characteristics and circumstances that are relevant to the choice of penal purpose in the case, or to the plausibility of a penal strategy by which the sentence is expected to advance its purpose. The concluding article is a rejoinder to Professor Ruback's criticism of the U.S. sentencing guidelines for their complexity, their lack of articulated purpose, and their unreliability. Relevant tables, notes, and references accompany the articles. For individual papers, see NCJ-180115-17. For the first part of this series, see NCJ-180118.