The author begins with an assessment of the precedent-setting mental health case law on the execution of mentally disordered inmates. This assessment considers the evolution of related issues such as the mentally ill inmate's right to refuse drug treatment as well as the conditions under which a finding of incompetency does or does not mitigate capital punishment. The paper then presents an overview of two methods for engaging in discourse analysis: structural semiotics and deconstructionism. Each of these approaches provides unique insight into the unconscious intent of the Supreme Court. The overview lays the theoretical foundation for the application that follows. Next, the paper considers how discourse analysis, based on principles found in structural legal semiotics and legal deconstructionism, furthers the understanding of the Supreme Court's more covert meaning when sustaining capital punishment for incompetent mentally ill offenders on death row. In this context, the paper considers the word "incompetency" and "treatment" as linguistic artifacts (coded messages) that signify implicit values and hidden assumptions for the Court regarding the mentally ill and disordered death row inmates. The paper concludes by speculating on the implications of this analysis for the future of mental health confinement law and policy and for the execution of psychiatrically disordered offenders. 163 footnotes