Hirschi and Gottfredson note that Geis' critique contains a number of negative assessments of self-control theory advanced by others, so they take this opportunity to respond to some of the issues raised by their critics in general. Hirschi and Gottfredson settled on "self-control," defined as "concern for the long-term consequences of one's acts" as the element of restraint in their theory. "Criminal and analogous behaviors" is the conceptual equivalent of "low self-control." They acknowledge that the match is not perfect, since it would be preferable to have a single concept that covers the many manifestations of low self-control, but they acknowledge that they have not been able to compose one. Hirschi and Gottfredson do not challenge the criticism that some crimes do not fit the theory when a legal definition of crime is not used. Some acts of terrorism, some forms of espionage, and even some ordinary crimes may be committed to achieve broad or long-term objectives. Tests of the applicability of the theory to such offenses are straightforward: Are those engaging in them more likely to engage in other deviant or criminal activities? If the crimes in question are indeed altruistic, their causes and the tendency of the state to punish them would not seem to require explanation by criminologists. Consequently, their potential existence provides a weak critique of a general theory of crime. Other aspects of the self-control theory examined are the tautology problem, its stability, and its ability to explain the influence of the peer group. Overall, the authors conclude that empirical research has supported their self-control theory as a general explanation of criminal behavior. 3 notes and 35 references