These contradictions are at the heart of why so many Italian and Japanese politicians are corrupt. Their corrupt conduct is condoned, indeed encouraged, by the Italian and Japanese party systems. This paper also examines what distinguishes Italy and Japan from most other industrialized parliamentary democracies, describes their political structures and the nature of political corruption, analyzes the interrelationship between structure and corruption, assesses the political reform legislation enacted in the 1990's, and evaluates the likelihood that such reforms will resolve the contradictions between the legal system and political behavior or transform institutions that foster corrupt politicians. The Italian and Japanese experiences of political corruption suggest that unlike the remedy of democracy proposed for many transitional states that are encountering corruption, democracy in and of itself is not a cure. The public is not a central player in the exposure of corruption and the mounting of related reforms. New "reformer" leadership may exhibit the same attitudes and behavior as the old practitioners of corruption. Sanctions against corruption in terms of the limited role of law and the weak nature of legal restraints remain. There is a symbiotic relationship between politicians and businesses. laws and institutions may facilitate bringing the giver and receiver together. Because corruption is a multifaceted, condoned, and fostered activity by the political and economic elites, there are some enduring obstacles to its control. 82 references