The British Army won Egypt for England, but rather than use the Army to maintain control, the British preferred indirect rule to limit their political and financial costs. The system of rule through native proxy thus set up a political dynamic in Egypt between 1882 and 1914 that allowed Egyptians to contest at least the degree of British control over their country. As native institutions concerned with public security, the Egyptian police and ghaffirs (village police) became tempting targets for the British to dominate the longer it appeared they would be staying in Egypt. Egyptians were anxious to keep them as part of their sphere of autonomy. The police and ghaffirs, therefore, became a focal point in the Anglo-Egyptian struggle for power. A central issue was the debate over police reforms, inextricably linked to the struggle to control the police and ghaffirs. The power to reform the police entailed the power to control. The debate was over the degree and nature of reform as well as over the control of the reform process. The British instituted some landmark changes in the police and ghaffirs during their occupation of Egypt between 1882 and 1914. Nevertheless, British officials admitted that the Egyptian police and ghaffirs did not function effectively under the reforms. This book documents these failures, which included weak detective work, infringement of the rights of individuals, participation in political repression, corruption, subjection to harsh military discipline, and poor pay and working conditions. The political and economic impacts of the Egyptian police are examined, along with the reasons for their ineffectiveness and negative impact on Egyptian society. Chapter notes, a 127-item bibliography, and a subject index