Durkheim's perspectives on punishment have been examined in considerable detail, but criminologists still neglect his account of the causal relationship between sentiments of human sympathy and the intensity of criminal punishment. Unlike conventional accounts that propose a negative relationship between these variables, Durkheim argues that there are conditions under which the relationship is positive. According to Durkheim, increments in feelings of compassion for humans in general can heighten public outrage to acts of human criminality and, for this reason, can intensify the punitive response to such crimes. Durkheim's account of this relationship is abstracted from his theory of penal evolution and is revised to improve its plausibility and temper its problematic implications. The author concludes that Durkheim's account represents another irony of his work that warrants attention and that may further understanding of the persistence of both imprisonment and punitive attitudes. 35 references and 2 figures