The article examines evidence that there is a trade-off in Portugal between efforts to control drug crimes and efforts to control property crimes. Data for this study, which covered 274 municipalities in Portugal in 1996, came from census reports and various Portuguese central government organizations. Findings show that the previous year’s level of property crime and the demand for drug control, reflected in the number of drug arrests, are important factors in allocating police resources. Findings also support the operation of deterrence theory in Portugal. Criminal behavior seems to respond to negative incentives, i.e., the probability of arrest and of conviction for property crime. The article claims that the main inference to be drawn from this study is that fighting property crime through vigorous enforcement of drug laws is ineffective. Allocating more police resources to the enforcement of aggressive drug policy and away from other areas of law enforcement hurts the property crime rate. In summary, exclusively targeting specific policy problems, in this case drug law enforcement, may have serious and unexpected effects on society. Tables, notes, references