In Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment ("No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") requires that an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation "must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of a lawyer, either retained or appointed," and that "the defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." To provide the necessary incentive for police to abide by its ruling, the Court also adopted the exclusionary rule that any testimonial evidence resulting from the interrogation of a suspect who had not been given the relevant warnings could not be admitted into the prosecution's case against him. In a string of post-Miranda cases (including Michigan v. Tucker, New York v. Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad), the Court characterized the Miranda warnings as mere prophylactic and not in themselves constitutionally mandated measures designed to safeguard every defendant's exercise of the right against compelled self-incrimination. Although some constitutional scholars expected that it might find a way to use these precedents to overrule Miranda, the Court expressly declined to do so in the recently decided Dickerson v. U.S., based largely on the rationale of stare decisis. The Court's decision in this case, however, did not attempt to find and defend an underlying rationale that would reconcile Miranda with the previous relevant cases that threatened to undermine Miranda. In finding and defending such a rationale, this paper provides support for strengthening Miranda, rather than merely accepting the decision as is. 42 notes