There are four categories of rationale for the inclusion of the victim or the victim's information at sentencing. Three of them are instrumentalist in nature: improving sentence outcomes, enhancing system efficiency and service quality, and benefits for victims; the fourth emphasizes process values, citizenship, and rights. Without favoring any of these justifications, the author argues that these rationales often remain indistinct in political debate, yet each has significant and contrasting implications. In the United States, the arguments in favor of the proposed Constitutional amendment for specifying the rights of crime victims focus on balancing the rights of victims with those of defendants. In England and Wales, no rationale has assumed prominence. In the legislative debate on the relevant South Australian bill, several different strands of thought and rationale are evident. The possible contradictions in the eclectic range of justifications for victim participation in sentencing are often overlooked in favor of the intuitive feeling that it is right and appropriate to facilitate such participation; however, the diversity of motivations for including the victim at sentencing and the failure of reform to either comprehend them or acknowledge those by which they have been influenced pose significant problems for the implementation of reforms and defining the specific detail of procedures to include the victim in sentencing. Some problems in implementing reforms include defining the victim, defining the content of the statements victims are allowed to make at the sentencing hearing, preparing and processing the victim's information, and determining the effectiveness of reforms. 12 notes and 55 references