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Analytic Models and Policy Prescription: Understanding Recent Innovation in U.S. Counterterrorism

NCJ Number
189107
Journal
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume: 24 Issue: 3 Dated: May/June 2001 Pages: 159-181
Author(s)
Richard Falkenrath
Date Published
May 2001
Length
23 pages
Annotation
This article argues that much of the debate over the need for a domestic preparedness program originates in disparate approaches to analyzing terrorism.
Abstract
The threat of terrorism, particularly terrorism involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), has received a large amount of attention in the last decade. Since the mid-1990's, the Federal Government has embarked on a national effort to prepare the country for acts of WMD terrorism. A key component of the counterterrorism agenda is the domestic preparedness program, a series of initiatives aimed at reducing the country’s vulnerability to a WMD terrorist attack. These initiatives include providing specialized training and equipment to various response personnel; sponsoring new research and development projects; collecting information on potential threats; and aiming to improve the coordination and organization of governmental efforts. However, there is a heated debate over whether or not the United States needs a domestic preparedness program at all. Terrorism studies specialists use an internal model that analyzes the root causes, motives, and historical patterns of terrorism. These specialists conclude that the threat of WMD terrorism is not sufficient to warrant the domestic preparedness budget. Policy makers and national security experts, however, rely on an external risk assessment model that considers terrorism within the context of the many risks to American security. This assessment model evaluates WMD terrorism on the basis of risk and consequences, and reaches a logical conclusion that the potential for mass destruction not only merits, but also requires a level of domestic preparedness. 5 tables, 1 figure, and 58 notes.