Specific and identifiable patterns in the administrative organization of courts, coupled with a high degree of legal discretion and procedural complexities, allow judges and court personnel to extract additional illicit fees for services rendered. This condition is aggravated by the lack of alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes, which gives the official court system a virtual monopoly on dispute resolution. These factors associated with corrupt judicial practices provide targets for reform measures. Developing countries such as Chile and Uganda have enacted a simple procedural code while introducing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This has brought a reduction in the reports of court-related corruption. Moreover, the success stories of Singapore and Costa Rica show that corruption has been reduced by creating specialized administrative offices that support the courts in matters related to court notifications, budget and personnel management, and cash and case flows. These administrative support offices shared by many courts have decentralized administrative decision making while reducing the previously high and unmonitored concentration of organizational tasks in the hands of judges. 25 references