An important initial determination is just what agents may have been used, where the contaminated areas are, and where control points are being set up for decontamination of both responders and the public, all of which relate to where the hot zone (contaminated area) is. The warm zone, where response personnel make entry and exits, where decontamination typically occurs and evidence is processed, is equally important. In order to keep their team unexposed and their chemical protective gear intact after an entry is made, an entry team leader will need to factor into his assault plan where such zones have been designated by the Incident Commander (IC). Early liaison between law enforcement entry teams and the IC, as well as the Fire Department/HazMat component and EOD/Bomb Squad unit on scene, will be crucial to the success of all three entities. The most likely scenario for an armed terrorist engaging the team weapons fire is not within the hot zone but external to the zone at the perimeter. It is probably even more likely that the terrorists would no longer even be in the area, once a chemical or biological device was armed/set off. This does not mean that a team should not still train for operations inside the zone, but that the IC chooses not to send the assault element in first, or in some cases not at all. Prior to making an entry, if at all possible a robot should be sent in ahead of the SWAT personnel, to characterize whether there is an explosive environment present. A terrorist scenario may not be suitable for a typical dynamic entry. Increased difficulty in movement due to protective suits, the size of a facility that must be cleared, the limited capacity of a SCBA air bottle, and the knowledge that secondary devices may be set inside are all reasons why a quick, aggressive entry may be inappropriate as well.