As a nation, we are too ill-prepared to deal with terrorist acts using chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. It may take 15 years to put response systems into place. Bioterrorism is not likely to rise to the level of an apocalyptic event. Yet, terrorist groups today are loosely organized and driven by ideology and do not have much restraint. Although biological or chemical weapons are easier to produce, they are very difficult to disseminate. Agriculture is far easier to target than populations. Defenses against biological terrorism are based on ways with dealing with conventional threats when a new architecture of defense is needed. Interagency cooperation is paramount, such as what Los Angeles has. The FBI should use Los Angeles as a model for other metropolitan areas. Health and local services need to survey for and detect reportable diseases, and rapid dissemination of indications of a terrorist attack to emergency response agencies is essential. The challenge for agencies is to respond in a quick and effective manner. The first objective should be to protect the first responders then provide care to the victims. They will need vaccinations and hospital and home care. Tasks for response teams need to be spelled out with a data-flow plan, control activities. Intelligence and investigating personnel should be integrated. In the aftermath of an attack, agencies will need to inform the public on whether it is safe to return to work or, for example, drink the water. The media need to be kept abreast of accurate information. There is likely to be confusion as to who has jurisdiction to enforce a quarantine or how an area is decontaminated. Many detectors of biological agents are available. Emerging decontamination technologies are most likely to be successful. Bioweapons are diverse, and leaders need to deter agents' buildup. Appendix