The CWC, which was ratified by the majority of the world's nations, extends the no-use prohibitions on chemical weapons in the 1925 Geneva Protocol to outlaw the development, acquisition, production, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well. The CWC requires the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and arsenals over a 10-year period. This report explains the CWC's verification provisions in detail, followed by an account of the treaty's status after 18 months. The performance of the CWC's inspectorate is compared with that of the monitoring agency for the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Several aspects of the CWC's implementation are reviewed, including the performance of its governing bodies and the way that states have fulfilled their declaration and inspection obligations. The report notes that the CWC's activation has moved a number of countries to relinquish their chemical weapons programs, an indication that the behavioral norm against the possession of chemical weapons is beginning to take hold; however, not all of the news is good. Damaging policies promoted by individual countries have been adopted by the CWC's governing bodies, which in turn has fostered poor behavior by some states. This circular pattern threatens to undermine the CWC's landmark verification regime. This report focuses on some of these negative developments because of their serious implications for the long-term integrity of the CWC. Specific failures of the United States in providing effective leadership through role modeling in the implementation of the CWC are noted. Recommendations are offered for remedying behaviors that threaten to undermine the intentions of the CWC. 223 footnotes and 6 tables