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Reducing the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: What Contribution From Arms Control?

NCJ Number
194412
Author(s)
Michael Moodie
Date Published
2002
Length
12 pages
Annotation
This paper examines the arms control contributions to efforts designed to counter the threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBW).
Abstract
The author advises that if arms control is to make an effective contribution to the CBW challenges, policymakers must begin with an appreciation of the complex environment that will shape its application. One aspect of this environment is the convergence of the threat of state CBW proliferation and bioterrorism, which must be viewed as different aspects of the same problem. This will require an approach that is strategic, multifaceted in action, and implemented with a range of tools. Other factors in the complex environment are advancing science and technology that can impact the development of CBW and the need to engage biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries more productively. Given this environment, this paper identifies the separate challenges for chemical arms control and biological arms control. Challenges for chemical arms control include the destruction of weapons that already exist; the United States' unilateral exemptions pertinent to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) implementation; inspection procedures under the CWC; the adaptability of the CWC to advances in chemical science and technology; issues of cooperation and assistance; and the institutional context within which arms control efforts proceed. Challenges to biological arms control include the goals of the next arms control steps; the Biological Weapons Convention's draft protocol's expenditure of resources on activities not clearly or directly related to core proliferation concerns; the insistence of some parties to the Convention that all state parties be treated the same; the demand by some states for cooperation and assistance in the life sciences for peaceful purposes; and the possibility that failures in current arms control efforts may lead some states to abandon arms control altogether and rely on other measures to fight biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism. The author concludes with suggestions for strengthening the international community's ability to confront the state-terrorist convergence, addressing the advancing developments in science and technology, and fostering a better appreciation of the need for a new conceptual and policy environment.