If al-Qaida or other terrorist operatives were to gain access to a lethal contagious pathogen from a location anywhere in the world, they might recruit suicidal or unwitting individuals as carriers to launch disease attacks from one country to another, despite the likelihood that an epidemic would spread via intercontinental air travel to eventually decimate Islamic peoples among other noncombatants. Given this prospect, al-Qaida's reported interest in obtaining the smallpox pathogen should be a matter of grave international concern. Without standardized measures applied worldwide, terrorists could gain access to unprotected or least-protected facilities to obtain toxins and pathogens to be used in bioweapon attacks in distant locations. Although many countries are committed to developing or upgrading and implementing biosecurity measures and related legislation, these efforts vary from country to country, and significant security gaps remain in even the more secure states. Controlling access to pathogen cultures and toxins alone cannot prevent the malevolent use of biology and medicine, however. Improved detection and treatment capabilities could reduce the harm that bioterrorists can inflict. Better detection, moreover, would have forensic value and increase the likelihood that bioterrorists would be quickly identified, apprehended, and punished. In order to impede aspiring bioterrorists, biosecurity efforts only need to block any one of three general requirements for bioweapon production: skilled people, dangerous pathogens or toxins, and dual-use technologies. A crucial element in international efforts to limit access by proliferant countries to pathogens and toxins, as well as to equipment and supplies required for their weaponization, is the Australia Group, which is comprised of 33 member states plus the European Commission. This is an export control coordinating body that limits transfers of sensitive items related to biological and chemical weapons. In the United States, two new laws regulate lethal toxins and pathogens, an interagency working group to refine laboratory biosecurity procedures, and the formation of the Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities for biosecurity. International biosecurity measures should be strengthened by establishing an encompassing convention to criminalize bioterrorism and related activities worldwide. Another measure could be an international scientific commission and governing body to develop biosecurity standards and oversee their enforcement. It could also provide oversight of research that might be misused for biological weapons purposes. Whatever initiatives are undertaken by national and international authorities, biosecurity measures should be designed carefully to avoid undue constraints on legitimate scientific and medical research and productive commercial activities. 37 notes