The author asserts that criminal law alone cannot decrease levels of corruption. Instead, the author argues that if corporate corruption is to be deterred, the State will need to re-examine the relationship between the government, citizens, and businesses. However, major structural changes take time, and the criminal law offers a convenient back-up to the needed changes. The author explores five main elements involved in the use of criminal law to police corporate corruption. First, the author argues that corruption may be lowered by legalizing some currently illegal activities, while at the same time criminalizing other currently legal activities that have been shown to lead to corrupt practices. Second, clear and certain penalties should be set that will work to deter corruption. Third, law enforcement authorities need to be equipped with the tools required to effectively fight corruption; tools such as the discretionary use of plea bargains to encourage participants to provide information to police. Fourth, the author argues that organizations should be held criminally accountable for the corrupt acts of employees. Fifth, law enforcement should design strategies that allow them to capitalize on the intersection of corporate corruption and organized crime. In conclusion, the author asserts that criminal law should never strive to achieve complete rectitude but should rather seek to identify and then to deter those persons or activities causing the most damage to society. References