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Corruption and Regulatory Structures

NCJ Number
207126
Journal
Law & Policy Volume: 26 Issue: 3 & 4 Dated: July & October 2004 Pages: 329-346
Author(s)
Anthony Ogus
Date Published
July 2004
Length
18 pages
Annotation
This article examines the problem of suppressing corruption in developing nations, focusing specifically on a critique of the conventional, regulatory strategies espoused by Western institutions.
Abstract
One of the major obstacles to economic growth in developing nations has been identified as corruption. Governments in these developing countries have fallen under increased scrutiny and pressure from the World Bank and other international organizations to combat the problem. Western institutions have been urging developing countries to adopt the regulatory methods used to constrain corruption in Western industrialized societies. These regulatory methods focus on greater accountability and transparency in decisionmaking and on intensifying law enforcement efforts. The author argues that these strategies are not necessarily appropriate for developing nations facing problems of restricted law enforcement resources and deeply culturally embedded practices of corruption. Rather than adopting the Western regulatory model, the author asserts that developing nations should focus on reducing the opportunities for corruption within the context of regulatory decisionmaking, instead of attempting to suppress it altogether. The key aspects of regulatory institutions and procedures that have the potential of achieving the goal of reducing opportunities for corruption are identified, some of which are inconsistent with regulatory methods recommended by Western institutions. Reducing opportunities for corruption will not only be a more effective means of controlling corruption, it will also demand fewer resources than the Western regulatory approach. References