Due to the recurrent media hype and the reluctance of Government officials to disclose data and information on sensitive issues such as terrorism and the vulnerability of information infrastructures, the public is often unsure about what to believe. This article seeks to demonstrate how unstructured and implausible the use of cyberterrorism is. The article first begins with a discussion of the literature on terrorism and notes that even before September 11, 2001, terrorism was a major field of study for international politics and international security scholars. This is followed by a discussion of cyberterrorism and its meanings, why it could appeal to would-be cyber-terrorists, and what these individuals might hope to achieve by using it. A major problem of studying cyberterrorism is that the term is somewhat ambiguous and can be applied to a variety of subjects ranging from “script-kiddies” blocking their school’s server to professional terrorists. The article then goes on to summarize how cost-benefit tools operate and applies the cost-benefit analysis to the case of cyberterrorism. The United State is used as the “yardstick” for examples in this article because it is the most "wired" country, and while it is the most vulnerable to attack it is also the country that spends the most money to protect its information infrastructure. The cost-benefit analysis revealed that cyberterrorism is not a very efficient substitute for more traditional terrorist tools, such as bombs. Rather, it is more effective for terrorists to exploit the information infrastructure to fight a “war of ideas,” spreading their beliefs and points of view to a wider audience. Notes, tables