In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks upheld a Kansas law allowing for the indefinite civil commitment of sexual offenders found to have a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” rendering them unable to control their violent sexual tendencies. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane clarified the Hendricks ruling by ruling that something less than an absolute lack of control was required for the indefinite civil commitment of violent sex offenders; specifically, the Court noted that offenders eligible for commitment are those who find it “particularly difficult to control their behavior.” These rulings have implications for those in the mental health treatment community who work with sexually violent offenders. The current paper explores what these rulings mean for how volitional impairment is to be conceptualized by the courts and by mental health professionals. Mental health clinicians play an important role in the establishment of volitional impairment in civil commitment cases and are often called to testify in court. Unfortunately, the Court has not provided much information on what it means to be capable of controlling one’s conduct beyond the ruling in Crane, which established that evidence of volitional impairment is required. Even among mental health clinicians and a wide array of legal literature, there is no meaningful understanding of the mental components that contribute to individual control. Such pervasive ambiguity and uncertainly revolving around the meaning and etiology of volitional impairment bring up a number of ethical concerns, such as the requirement that professional judgments be based on “established scientific and professional knowledge.” Thus, in terms of court-solicited testimony, and given the magnitude of the consequences for the offender, clinicians are advised to provide details on symptom patterns and client characteristics, but withhold judgments related to volitional capacity. References