The main argument put forth by the author is that when a court interprets a criminal statute, that interpretation should be applied retroactively to any cases that occurred before the interpretation but after the statute took effect. A 2004 interpretation of a 2002 statute can be applied to any cases occurring after the statute took effect in 2002 yet before the interpretation occurred in 2004. The author contends that until recently, the Illinois courts have correctly applied this rule, yet following a U.S. Supreme Court decision, confusion has set in with regards to the doctrine of retroactivity. The article opens with a discussion of the statutory interpretation and application rule and then moves on to an examination of the U.S. Supreme Court case Teague v. Lane, which the author states should apply to a limited category of judge-made law and not to legislation. The Teague case, in other words, should only impact criminal cases involving new, judge-made law on criminal procedure that has constitutional implications. The U.S. Supreme Court clarified its Teague decision in the case of Fiore v. White, when it reversed a Pennsylvania ruling that misinterpreted the doctrine of retroactivity of judicial decisions. Through an examination of a series of court cases in Illinois, the author illustrates the way in which the Illinois Supreme Court has misapplied the Teague rule. Footnotes