One of the main arguments put forth by those in favor of hate-crime laws is that when crimes are committed out of hate the result is a violation of the conception of equality or fair treatment that is central to the political morality of the United States. The author examines and critiques this argument as he contends that hate-crime laws serve to impose a penalty upon wrongdoers that is in excess of what she or he deserves, which violates a fundamental principle of American penal justice. One of the rhetorical strategies used by those in favor of hate-crime laws is to claim that those who commit crimes out of hate are inherently more deserving of punishment than those who commit similar crimes in the absence of hate directed at a protected group. The author argues that this claim and its supporting arguments are not convincing of the need for hate-crime laws and contends that hate crimes are not inherently morally worse than similar, non-hate crimes. Thus, to inflict greater punishment on hate criminals is a violation of the penal justice principle that punishment should be proportionate to the crime committed. In closing, the author shows how hate violence can be punished in the absence of hate-crime laws by criminalizing the reasons for crimes when they bear on the facts related to the actor’s culpability, for instance when the hate of the actor impacts on the degree of physical or psychological torment inflicted on the victim. Notes