Data for this article were obtained from two research projects funded by the United Kingdom Home Office. One study examined strategic criminal intelligence procedures across the police sector throughout the country. The second study explored intelligence-led policing in two British police forces. Both studies involved methodologies that included observational fieldwork, qualitative interviews, and analyses of key documents. The current article is based on common themes that emerged from both studies. The themes pertain to the nature and definition of policing intelligence, the consequences of the new rubric of intelligence-led policing for the division of labor in the police sector, and shared understanding of the implication of using the disruption of criminal activities as a tactic and key strategic performance indicator for policing. Organized crime has become a central focus of police work, and the tactic for countering organized crime involves police interventions that disrupt ongoing criminal activity. Disruption as a tactic is based on an assumption that police interventions will destabilize the social organization that supports ongoing criminal enterprises. The tactics of intelligence-led policing for the purpose of disrupting criminal activities brings with it a host of problems. These include flaws in the accuracy and sufficiency of the intelligence upon which police action is based; the tendency to focus on minor players in a criminal network because they are more accessible targets for intelligence-gathering; the weakening of due process and privacy protections for targets of intelligence-gathering; and the tendency to slight the pursuit of individuals whose criminal behavior is irrational, erratic, and unconnected to an organized enterprise. 42 references