Three main principles affecting the relationships among coalitions are identified: (1) the overlapping memberships of the coalitions make tradeoffs among the coalitions more likely; (2) there is tension between the intelligence coalition and the military, financial, and law enforcement coalitions because anything that destroys terrorist networks also limits the ability to collect information about the terrorist network; and perhaps most importantly, (3) all of the coalitions are not equal. Implications for policy are discussed and include the observation that any successful counterterror strategy must consider how the coalitions will interact with one another because action in one coalition will necessarily impact other coalitions. The key to effectively utilizing coalitions in the fight against terror is to understand that not all coalitions can be leveraged at one time; tradeoffs are inherent in the process. The author identifies at least five different counterterror coalitions, each addressing a different functional area: (1) military; (2) financial; (3) law enforcement; (4) intelligence; and (5) reconstruction. While each of the coalitions has different purposes, tasks, and members, they are all tied together. The actions of one coalition inextricably affect the actions of another, often requiring political tradeoffs and difficult policy decisions. The author explains that the coalitions will shift and change over time, but their link will remain strong. Membership will eventually overlap, allowing the different coalitions to form a dynamic and adaptive network in which they pursue their different tasks toward the shared goal of controlling terrorism. The author compares the five coalitions in terms of scope, formation costs, maintenance costs, the utility of international and nongovernmental organizations to the coalition, the utility of substate and private actors to the coalition, and in terms of whether their actions are preventive or reactive. Notes, references