Although some of the criticism leveled at the U.S. Government's annual terrorism report is valid, the author concludes that overall the report provides fairly accurate, one-of-a-kind data on international terrorism. The controversy over the U.S. Government’s report on terrorism has focused on two main issues: (1) the definition of terrorism used in the publication, and (2) what counts as an international terrorist incident. Moreover, the U.S. Government only offers a partial picture of worldwide terrorism because it reports only on international terrorism, completely ignoring domestic terrorism, which is estimated to account for approximately 60 percent of terrorism worldwide. Yet, in its defense, the U.S. Government never purported to measure domestic terrorism. Following an historical account of how the U.S. Government’s annual terrorism report was founded, the author focuses on the downfall of the report in 2004, which involved inaccurate data analysis of 2003 international terrorism patterns. Other criticisms of the annual terrorism report are similarly examined and include the charge that the terrorism report is a partisan document that is used by various administrations to justify counterterrorism policies. In closing, the author, a 28-year veteran of the State Department, eschews the notion that the report is a political tool, stating that researchers working on the report never implied that they were pushed to manipulate data or analysis. Notes