This chapter concludes that American interrogation methods in the war on terror are not only morally questionable but have also failed to follow research-based interrogation principles for obtaining reliable information. Based on interviews within intelligence insiders, the author notes that by mid-2004 there were no military intelligence personnel of officer rank in the U.S. Army who specialized in interrogation. A similar neglect was also apparent within the CIA. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, this handicap drove policymakers to fill intelligence gaps by all available means. One of their principal methods became the coercive interrogation of prisoners. At every location in the global war on terror, previous restraints on the treatment of prisoners were reconsidered, and ultimately abandoned in significant ways. During the late spring of 2004, a series of leaks to the U.S. media persuaded the Bush administration to publish much of the internal legal paper trail that preceded and endorsed such methods for managing and interrogating terrorist prisoners. This chapter describes the chronology and content of these documents as they bear upon the interrogation methods being used with detained terrorist suspects. The author compares these methods with international definitions of torture and the abuse of prisoners as they have evolved over decades of war and conflict among nations. He compares specific techniques used by American interrogators with accepted international definitions of torture, concluding that they not only violate international standards for the treatment of prisoners but also those traditionally followed by American military personnel in war time. 6 notes and 8 references