The Court's decision also indicates that measures of national consensus show that American society no longer approves of the death penalty for juvenile offenders. The "Roper" decision is consistent with the Court's reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which held that the majority of American society did not approve of executing the mentally retarded. "Atkins" also reasoned that the death penalty was inherently disproportionate for mentally retarded persons because their cognitive impairments made them less than fully accountable for their actions. This article argues against "Roper's" continuing the precedent set in "Atkins." In "Roper, as in "Atkins," the Court continues to undermine the legitimacy and competency of the American jury system as the means and measure of what Americans believe to be acceptable punishment. Further, the Court continued to erode State autonomy by making broad prohibitions against the administration of the death penalty for entire classes of offenders. Also, "Roper" should not mirror the reasoning in "Atkins," since juveniles do not have absolute characteristics that bear upon culpability. It should be left to individual courts to determine whether a specific juvenile convicted of a capital crime has the mental and emotional development to establish a culpability that warrants the death penalty. 321 footnotes