The main assertion is that the July 7 bombings were a result of failures in both intelligence and policy and that these failures might have emerged in an environment of limited intelligence oversight arrangements in the United Kingdom. Shortly before the July 7 London suicide bombings that claimed 52 lives and injured several hundred others, the Labour Party, which had just won re-election, lowered the terrorism threat level in the United Kingdom. In response, the Labour Party produced a narrative of the events leading up to the bombings and the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) undertook an inquiry into the intelligence and security matters surrounding the bombings. The author relies on these two documents to analyze the nature of the intelligence failure of the British Government that resulted in the terrorist suicide bombings. One possible explanation for the intelligence failure is that traditionally, counter-terrorism resources in the United Kingdom have been devoted to countering the Irish republican terrorism that has historically represented the most salient threat to the United Kingdom. The focus on Northern Ireland effectively diverted the attention of UK intelligence agencies away from the threat of international terrorism. The ISC report attributed the intelligence failure to resource constraints, particularly in terms of the surveillance of suspected terrorists. Limited resources for intelligence work led to the prioritization of intelligence investigations. While two of the bombers came under some surveillance, they were not deemed a high enough priority to thoroughly investigate. Although many analysts warned that suicide bombings could become a widely used tactic due to their impact in Iraq; the British Government concluded that suicide bombings on the UK mainland remained unlikely. In the days following the July 7 attacks, officials did not realize the bombings were suicide operations but instead believed that the bombers had escaped. 114 notes