This social network analysis of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist cell uncovered four main findings: (1) Samudra and Idris were the most important individuals within the cell, due to their high centrality scores; (2) the high density and degree of connexion scores indicated the cell had a higher focus on efficiency and was less covert; (3) Samudra was the weakest point in the cell, and his capture would possibly have led to the isolation of Team Lima (the suicide bomber and contingency nodes) and the loss of the most active and centralized member of the network; and (4) the visit of Muklas to Bali unnecessarily involved a high ranking member, and was operationally unsound. The use of social network analysis in this paper has aimed at identifying and analyzing the major structural and interactional features of a Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist cell. The analysis measured the level of each cell member’s activity, ability to access others, and the control over the flow of information within the network. It also assessed the overall group’s orientation toward either efficiency or covertness, and identified the group’s leaders or most valuable nodes, as well as the dense clusters, and the weaknesses within the network. The cell that conducted the 2002 Bali bombing was selected because it represented the largest and most coordinated attack that the group had undertaken to date. In addition, it provides a potential framework for the intelligence analysis of terrorist cells, enabling such a framework to assist in understanding the communication and structure of such cells and in predicting the likely outcomes of terrorist cells when employed in real-time intelligence analysis. 4 tables, 1 figure, and 89 notes