The PNP was created from the remnants of the Panamanian Defense Forces shortly after the 1989 American military intervention. Police departments rooted in a military system of management are referred to as paramilitary and typically stand in sharp contrast to police forces rooted in the British “watch and ward” system that uses civilian officers to solve social problems. The characteristics of paramilitary- and civilian-based police forces are contrasted, using examples from the PNP (paramilitary) and the Boston Police Department (BPD) (civilian-based). The author describes how the work of the BPD, particularly in regards to drug law enforcement, became decidedly paramilitary in nature during the 1980s despite the civilian, problem-solving roots of the American policing system. The problems experienced using this type of paramilitary strategy in the United States helped inform the work of the Panamanian National Security Planning Workshop in 2004, in which the author served as a U.S. Law Enforcement Development Advisor. Drawing on his experience working in drug law enforcement for the BPD during the 1980s, the author served as a strong proponent for steering the PNP away from a paramilitary crime control response in Panama and toward a problem-solving approach rooted in the principles of a civilian police force. The 1-year results of the new PNP strategy are broadly overviewed and include the design of a national crime statistics and mapping database, the restructuring of the PNP command staff and the development of semi-autonomous zone commanders, an emphasis of training, the institutional separation of paramilitary frontier police from the PNP, and the development of a system of public recognition. The United States is called upon to continue in its efforts to promote police modernization and management paradigm change throughout democratic countries. Notes