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Regulating Matters of Appearance: Tattoos and Other Body Art

NCJ Number
217410
Journal
FBI: Law Enforcement Bulletin Volume: 76 Issue: 2 Dated: February 2007 Pages: 25-32
Author(s)
Lisa A. Baker J.D.
Date Published
February 2007
Length
8 pages
Annotation
Through an analysis of the 1979 U.S. Supreme Court case, Kelley v. Johnson, this article explores the legal issues related to the regulation of police officers’ appearance.
Abstract
In Kelley v. Johnson the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that police departments may regulate the length and style of police officers’ hair. This ruling gave great discretion to police administrators in the regulation of the appearance of officers under their command. The yardstick used by the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of such regulations involved the analysis of whether there was a “rational connection” between a legitimate government objective and the regulation. For example, the regulation governing hair length and style was seen as accomplishing two governmental objectives: enhancing the recognizability of officers to the public and fostering a sense of solidarity within the police population. This “differential standard” was upheld and further defined in the case of Rathert v. Village of Peotone, when the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the chief of police had articulated sufficient rationale basis for prohibiting the wearing of earrings by male officers both on and off duty. Two cases are described in which officers raised questions about their first amendment rights after being directed to cover body tattoos. In these cases, the courts ruled that tattoos are a form of personal self-expression and are not a type of free speech that is protected by the first amendment. In other cases, officers have argued that attempts to regulate their appearance violate the equal protection clause. In these cases, officers were unable to demonstrate that they were members of a protected class who were treated differently from other officers based on some protected criteria, such as race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. Thus, while the deferential standard enumerated in Kelley stands, the decision remains in constant flux because of the changing ways and demographics of society. Endnotes