The main argument is that probation operates in a domain characterized by punishment and as such, different aims and values conflict within this domain. The author argues that probation is a moral activity that cannot be reduced to the techniques of effectiveness. In making this argument, the author points out two main considerations: (1) that the values and aims of the penal industry are inherently disputable, and (2) that there is a tight link between values and practice. These considerations, coupled with an awareness of diversity, imply that probation enjoys wide discretion and other characteristics that are at odds with contemporary management practices. Punishment-as-practices strives for a number of goals, but only some of these goals are attainable at no more than a limited extent while other goals may be self-defeating and still others incompatible with the justice system as a whole. Therefore, if punishment seeks to convey messages to the offender and to society, those messages are either distorted or even contradictory. As such, it is argued, the affirmation of societal values has only rhetorical worth. What is needed in probation practice and principle is an ethic that acknowledges the content of punishment as well as its justifications. This requires a morally significant probation practice that requires a competent, critical, and reflective workforce. Notes, references