The al Qaeda leadership’s indecisiveness on the utility of Lebanon as a theater for major operations against the West and its Arab allies and the disunity of the salafist jihadist movement in Lebanon support the conclusion that salafist jihadism in Lebanon will continue to present itself as a containable problem. Reducing the threat of salafist jihadism will require a balanced mix of soft and hard measures. Hard measures include active security and counterterrorism measures by the Lebanese military and security institutions. Soft tactics include creative diplomacy on behalf of Lebanon and its global allies. This article seeks to examine the history and dynamics of salafist jihadism in Lebanon. It explains its causes, investigates its impact on Lebanese domestic security, and explores its future trajectory. The article puts forth a range of policy prescriptions that could help the Lebanese state effectively reduce and ultimately eliminate the threat of local salafist jihadism. The article attempts to prove that al Qaeda in Lebanon has an indigenous constituency. 94 notes