The concept of grid-group theory is employed in this article to show how crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) exist as structures that are vulnerable to the influence of a range of conflicting, competing, and contradictory modes of social organization that pull in very different directions. This level of focus affords a better understanding of the difficulties faced by CDRPs, and of how they might be overcome in the pursuit of networked governance. The desire to see the emergence of genuine networked governance is frustrated by the establishment of conditions that empower rational goal and hierarchical governmental discourses over open systems and self-governance. Until these conditions within the field are altered, the progress of networked governance, whatever its merits and demerits, will continue to be hindered and undone. CDRPs were required to form in the wake of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, with their primary responsibilities being the production of the crime audit, and the development of a crime reduction strategy following community consultation. However, a strong emphasis on crime reduction, and a funding and performance management framework oriented towards this end has served to push CDRPs in this direction, away from a more radical agenda of community safety. Focusing on competing governmental discourses enables an understanding as to why it is that an open systems, networked approach to the local governance of crime has struggled to become established in the United Kingdom, despite the promising foundations laid by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. Figures, references