In both Punjab and Kashmir, early counterinsurgency efforts relied on less discriminate campaigns conducted by central armed forces or by illegitimate local proxies. The outcomes were strengthened insurgencies. In both cases, the Indian state adapted by seeking the cooperation of legitimate local moderates in more discriminate counterinsurgency efforts. These later, “balanced” strategies were more effective. This was particularly true in Punjab, where conditions for local cooperation were more favorable. It is noted that ethnic insurgencies had received less scholarly attention than colonial or ideological insurgencies, even as they had become the predominant form of insurgency following the decolonization process and then the end of the Cold War. In the face of ethnic insurgencies, the work sought to question the effectiveness of the various counterinsurgency strategies adopted by host states, and whether democracies were more likely to succeed by pursuing some kinds of counterinsurgency strategies rather than others. The article states that established theory indicates that multiple counterinsurgency strategies, if thoroughly implemented, could defeat ethnic insurgencies. Host state regime type, particularly democracy, is said to be important as a constraint on the will to employ and thoroughly implement some counterinsurgency methods, and democracies are most likely to defeat ethnic insurgencies by employing more cooperative or “balanced” strategies. Although such strategies employ economic and political inducements and rely on local ethnic elements to help fight the insurgents, they also depend on a credible host state commitment to sustain the counterinsurgency for as long as it takes to win. Case studies of India's multiphased counterinsurgency efforts in Punjab and Kashmir are presented in this context to offer some preliminary evidence in support of this theory. Tables, references, notes