This article examines the Tessling case from a philosophical perspective and discusses the cogency of the central line of reasoning that the Supreme Court of Canada employed to support its conclusion about the heat patterns (consistent with its being the site of a substantial marijuana grow op) generated from Tessling's home. Even though the article supports the Supreme Court's position that Tessling did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat patterns emanating from his house, it notes that Tessling's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure may have been violated in other ways. If the heat patterns emanating from Tessling's home could not be considered private information because it said so little about him, it argues, it perhaps added nothing to the weight of the informants' tips; these alone were considered insufficient by the courts for a warrant. This would render the search of Tessling's home unreasonable and consequently contrary to section 24.2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Figure, references