Currently, prevalent concepts about how the public will respond in the event of a bioterrorist attack range from helplessness to hysteria to a concerned, rational humanitarian response in doing what needs to be done. Various roles for government agencies are envisioned in accordance with these assumptions about mass behavior in such a context. These responses include riot control, credible communication, the mobilization of volunteers, and laissez faire (“Everybody for himself“). This paper suggests that rather than assuming that certain mass behaviors are predetermined by various embedded characteristics of human behavior, public officials responsible for emergency management should begin now to cultivate the involvement of the public as a full partner in preparation for, response to, and recovery from a bioterrorist attack. An example of such an effort is the convening for two working groups that are reframing bioterrorism policy discussions under the sponsorship of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. One product of the working groups’ discussions has been the creation of five strategic goals for an effective response. These goals are preventive, curative, and supportive care in order to limit death and suffering; the defense of civil liberties by using the least restrictive intervention necessary; the preservation of economic stability; the discouragement of scapegoating, hate crime, and stigmatization of people or places; and assisting individuals and the larger community to rebound from unpredictable and traumatic events. The essay concludes with a discussion of the competing goals that may arise in the course of an epidemic and how this might be avoided. 2 tables and 38 references