Findings show the questions that corruptors must answer in deciding to fix matches and the options on who to bribe to provide the best chance of delivering a successful fix. Analysis of the decision to fix a game rests upon five key questions; is the game important enough to fix; are there moral impediments; can the team win honestly; can the corruptor afford to fix the game; and if caught, if there is a high risk of sanction. The study analyzed the constraints and incentives that an internal corruptor must consider in arriving at the decision to fix a match, how the game is fixed, and proposes some ideas on how an administrator might make it more difficult to fix matches. Data were collected through interviews, the text of confessions of match corruptors, and analysis of information contained in a database on fixed matches compiled by the author. The author examines the relative merits of who to bribe: match officials, the opposing team, or the opposing team administration. Several recommendations are provided to reduce the prevalence of corruption. Figures and tables