IT ALSO HELD THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A FULL ADVERSARY HEARING. THIS NOTE ARGUES THAT DUE PROCESS DOES REQUIRE A FULL PRELIMINARY HEARING BEFORE OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN ACCUSED IS INCARCERATED, WHETHER FOR A FELONY OR A MISDEMEANOR, EVEN IF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT. THE AUTHOR NOTES THAT THE COURT IN GERSTEIN, BY ONLY FOCUSING UPON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS INCORPORATED INTO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, ANALYZED ONLY ONE NARROW SEGMENT OF DUE PROCESS - THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN THE SEIZURE AND INITIAL INCARCERATION AS OPPOSED TO THOSE NEEDED TO PREVENT THE ACCUSED'S UNJUST INCARCERATION WHILE SUBSEQUENTLY AWAITING TRIAL. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE PROPOSITION THAT ONE MAY BE INCARCERATED WITHOUT BEING AFFORDED A PRELIMINARY HEARING CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OF THE 1970'S. CITED ARE GOLDBERG V. KELLY (1970), WHICH HELD THAT A FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS REQUIRED BEFORE A STATE CAN TERMINATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS TO A WELFARE RECIPIENT AND MORRISSEY V. BREWER (1972) AND CAGNON V. SCARPELLI (1973) IN WHICH THE COURT RULED THAT A PAROLEE OR PROBATIONER WAS ENTITLED TO BOTH A MINIMAL INQUIRY BEFORE THE REVOCATION HEARING. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING FULL EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS BEFORE PRETRIAL INCARCERATION ARE ALSO NOTED, INCLUDING THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH INCARCERATION TO THE DEFENDANT, THE NATURE OF AND REASONS FOR A PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND THE ENORMOUS EXTENT OF THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION TO PROSECUTE.