IN JONES, THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGED A DEPRIVATION OF HIS SON'S CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO LIFE BY A STATE OFFICER ACTING UNDER AUTHORITY OF STATE LAW WHO KILLED THE PLAINTIFF'S SON WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ARREST HIM FOR ALLEGEDLY STEALING AN AUTOMOBILE, UNDER SECTION 1983 OF 42 USC (1970). THE DEFENDANT MARSHALL ASSERTED THAT THE COMMON LAW OF CONNECTICUT WHICH MAKES THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY A POLICE OFFICER A PRIVILEGE WHERE THE OFFICER BOTH REASONABLE AND ACTUALLY BELIEVES THAT SUCH FORCE IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE ARREST OF A FELONY SUSPECT. THE PLAINTIFF ARGUED THAT STATE LAW SHOULD NOT APPLY TO A CASE BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 1983. THE DISTRICT COURT HELD THAT SINCE THE STATE LAW WAS CONSTITUTIONAL, IT SHOULD CONTROL THE CASE. THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED THE RESULT BUT DISAGREED WITH THE REASONING BECAUSE IT FOUND THAT STATE LAW IS NOT CONTROLLING IN A SECTION 1983 ACTION. AFTER EXAMINING BOTH THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS COURT AND ITS DECISION MAKING PROCESS, THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT THE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE DEFENSE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RECOGNIZED BY THE SUPREME COURT; DECLINED TO ADOPT A UNIFORM FEDERAL STANDARD DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S PRIVILEGE; AND GRANTED STATES CONSIDERABLE LEEWAY IN DEVELOPING ITS OWN RULES OF PRIVILEGE.