THE EXTENT OF ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS DEPENDS UPON THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE TASK. ANOTHER SOURCE OF LIMITATION OF PUNISHMENT (OR ENFORCEMENT) ARISES OUT OF THE NATURE OF THE SUPPLY OF OFFENSES. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUPPLY WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF SOCIETY ARE THE STRUCTURE OF PENALTIES BY OFFENSE, THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION FOR EACH OFFENSE, AND CERTAIN COSTS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE OFFENDING ACTIVITY. IN ADDITION, THE PENALTIES AND CHANCES OF DETECTION AND PUNISHMENT MUST BE INCREASING FUNCTIONS OF THE ENORMITY OF THE OFFENSE. UNDER A STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES, EXPECTED PENALTIES INCREASE WITH EXPECTED GAINS TO THE OFFENDER SO THERE IS NO MARGINAL NET GAIN FROM LARGER OFFENSES. THE EXPENDITURES ON PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT SHOULD YIELD A DIMINUTION IN OFFENSES, AT THE MARGIN, EQUAL TO THE RETURN UPON THESE RESOURCES IN OTHER AREAS. THE WIDESPREAD FAILURE TO ADOPT RATIONAL CRITERIA OF ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS HAS BEEN OFTEN AND, PERHAPS, USUALLY DUE TO A SIMPLE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR AND NATURE OF RATIONAL ENFORCEMENT, IN ADDITION TO THE DESIRE OF THE PUBLIC NOT TO ENFORCE THE LAWS.