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WAIVABILITY BY GUILTY PLEA OF RETROACTIVELY ENDOWED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

NCJ Number
40107
Journal
Albany Law Review Volume: 41 Issue: 1 Dated: (1977) Pages: 115-139
Author(s)
D M KOLKO
Date Published
1977
Length
25 pages
Annotation
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES APPLYING TO THE WAIVER OF RETROACTIVE RIGHTS.
Abstract
ALTHOUGH IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT CERTAIN NEWLY RECOGNIZED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS ARE SO ESSENTIAL TO THE INTEGRITY OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION THAT THEY SHOULD BE MADE RETROACTIVE, BOTH THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS HAVE HELD THAT DEFENDANTS WHOSE CONVICTIONS WERE OBTAINED BY PLEAS OF GUILTY MAY NOT BENEFIT FROM THESE RIGHTS. THE AUTHOR TRACES THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF RETROACTIVITY AND WAIVER BY GUILTY PLEA FROM THE ORIGINAL DOCTRINE OF JOHNSON V. ZERBST (1938), WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DECIDED A WAIVER IS VALID ONLY WHEN IT WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY. UNDER THIS DOCTRINE, SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS COULD AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF CONVICTIONS BASED ON PLEAS OF GUILTY. IN THE 1970 DECISION BRADY V. U.S., THE SUPREME COURT ABANDONED THE ZERBST RULE AND ADOPTED AN ABSOLUTE CONCEPTION OF WAIVER. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SHIFT IN ATTITUDE AND ITS EFFECT ON THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ARE DISCUSSED IN A CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS....MSP