THE ARGUMENT OVER VOIRDIRE ARISES FROM THE SUPREME COURT AMENDED RULE 47A WHICH SHIFTS THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF VOIR DIRE TO COUNSEL. THE SECTION OF LITIGATION WHICH RECOMMENDED THE CHANGE SAW SEVERAL SHORTCOMINGS IN THE COURT'S EXAMINATION OF JURORS. THE COURT'S EXAMINATION WAS CONSIDERED 'PERFUNCTORY AND SUPERFICIAL,' IN THAT JUDGES SOMETIMES FAILED TO ASK FOLLOWUP QUESTIONS WHEN A JUROR HAD GIVEN A POSSIBLY BIASED ANSWER. MOREOVER, THE REPORT SUGGESTED THAT JURORS MAY SHAPE THEIR RESPONSES TO FIT THEIR IDEA OF WHAT THE JUDGE EXPECTS; MANY SUBTLE, BUT REAL BIASES MAY REMAIN UNDETECTED. COUNSEL'S GREATER FAMILIARITY WITH THE NATURE OF A CASE, SECTION ARGUED, WOULD REDUCE THE DANGER OF SEATING BIASED JURORS. THE AUTHOR BASES PART OF HIS ARGUMENT ON 30 YEARS TRIAL PRACTICE EXPERIENCE. HE POINTS OUT THAT TRIAL LAWYERS NEVER HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO BE PERFUNCTORY AND SUPERFICIAL; COUNSEL HAS ALWAYS CORRECTED HIS IGNORANCE OR MISUNDERSTANDING OF A CASE, AND ATTORNEYS, BY SUBMITTING SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS, HAVE MADE SURE THAT CONCEIVABLY PREJUDICIAL ANSWERS WERE FURTHER EXPLORED. HE ALSO STATES THAT HE HAS NEVER WITNESSED AN 'OVERAWED' PROSPECTIVE JUROR SHAPE HIS RESPONSES AND ANSWER UNTRUTHFULLY. WHEN THE JUDGE HIMSELF CONDUCTS THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, HE IS REQUIRED BY THE RULE TO SUPPLEMENT THE EXAMINATION TO THE EXTENT DEEMED PROPER; THE COURT MUST NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN CONDUCTING THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION, AND THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON COUNSEL'S INQUIRY MUST BE FAIR. IT IS NOTED THAT THE ATTORNEY'S MAIN INTEREST IS TO OBTAIN A VERDICT FAVORABLE TO HIS CLIENT AND THUS MUST TRY TO 'SELL HIMSELF'. THE JUDGE'S ONLY INTEREST, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS TO ESTABLISH THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF A PREJUDICE TOWARD EITHER PARTY. IN CONCLUSION, THE AUTH0R ADDS THAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT GUARANTEE THE DEFENDANT A FAVORABLE, BUT RATHER AN IMPARTIAL JURY. (SEE NCJ-43376 FOR A DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE FROM THE ATTORNEY'S VIEWPOINT).