THE JUDICIAL TENURE ACT, ORIGINALLY INTRODUCED IN THE 93RD CONGRESS AS S.4153 AND RESUBMITTED THEREAFTER AS S.1110 AND S.1423, PROVIDES FOR THE REMOVAL, CENSURE, OR INVOLUNTARY RETIREMENT OF A JUDGE WHOSE BEHAVIOR FAILS TO CONFORM TO CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS OR WHO SUFFERS FROM A DISABILITY THAT IMPAIRS THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES. THE AUTHOR OF THE BILL POINTS TO THE IMPRACTICALITY OF IMPEACHMENT AS THE SOLE MEANS OF PROVIDING A CHECK ON OVER 500 FEDERAL JUDGES. HISTORY SUGGESTS THAT IMPEACHMENT HAS NOT BEEN USED TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF GOOD BEHAVIOR IMPOSED ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY. IN ADDITION, THE ADEQUACY OF IMPEACHMENT AS A MEANS FOR DECIDING THE MERITS OF SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS IS QUESTIONABLE. THE JUDICIAL TENURE ACT WOULD CREATE A COUNCIL ON JUDICIAL TENURE TO INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AGAINST FEDERAL JUDGES. ON THE BASIS OF FINDINGS BY CIRCUIT COUNCILS OR CHIEF JUDGES, THE COUNCIL WOULD EITHER DISMISS A COMPLAINT, INVESTIGATE FURTHER, OR PROSECUTE THE COMPLAINT BEFORE THE COURT ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, WHICH COULD ORDER THE REMOVAL, CENSURE, OR RETIREMENT OF A JUDGE. THE COURT'S DECISION COULD BE APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT. IF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT, ANY APPEAL WOULD BE DIRECTED TO A TEMPORARY COURT OF DISCIPLINARY REVIEW. THE PROCEDURE IS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT, NOT REPLACE, THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS. THE ARGUMENT THAT SUCH A DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE WOULD DILUTE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY IS REFUTED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE APPLIES TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE JUDICIARY TO OTHER BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT, NOT TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUDGES WITHIN THE JUDICIARY. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT INTEND THAT IMPEACHMENT PRECLUDE THE JUDICIARY FROM DISCIPLINING ITSELF.