THE SUMMARY INCLUDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF PLEA BARGAINING IN THE JURISDICTIONS SURVEYED, DISCUSSIONS OF THE ROLES OF PROSECUTOR, DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND JUDGE IN THE PLEA-BARGAINING PROCESS, AND A REVIEW OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS. THE STUDY FOUND THAT THE SIZE OF THE POPULATION MAY NOT BE RELATED TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH PLEA BARGAINING IS EMPLOYED IN A GIVEN JURISDICTION. HOWEVER, THE DATA BASE IS INADEQUATE FOR ARRIVING AT GENERALIZATIONS WITH REGARD TO THIS AND OTHER ISSUES IN PLEA BARGAINING. THE STUDY ALSO FOUND THAT THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS GENERALLY IS CHARACTERIZED BY INFORMALITY AND LOW VISIBILITY. TRIAL COURTS EXERCISE LITTLE REAL SUPERVISION. VICTIMS TEND NOT TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE PROCESS. EFFORTS TO SET STANDARDS FOR PLEA-BARGAINING ACTIVITIES BY PROSECUTORS HAVE GIVEN LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY WITHIN THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE PROSECUTOR WHO SEEKS TO ABOLISH PLEA BARGAINING MAY SUCCEED ONLY IN CHANGING THE LOCUS OF THE PROCESS OR IN TRANSFORMING EXPLICIT NEGOTIATIONS INTO IMPLICIT ONES. METHODS OF AMELIORATING THE OBSERVED DEFECTS OF THE PROCESS -- E.G., INITIATING PROSECUTORIAL SCREENING, ESTABLISHMENT OF CUTOFF POINTS FOR ACCEPTING PLEA BARGAINS -- SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. (LKM)