IN THE FIRST ESSAY, THE AUTHOR ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN AND THEN TO DEFEND THE RIDICULED CLAIM THAT LAW IS CONCERNED WITH EXTERNAL CONDUCT AND MORALITY WITH INTERNAL CONDUCT. THE SECOND ESSAY PUTS FORWARD THE CLAIM THAT SOCIETY HAS A RIGHT TO BE PUNISHED. THE FIRST OF THREE ADDENDA TO THIS ESSAY TREATS MODES OF RESPONSE TO HUMAN CONDUCT THAT ARE NEITHER PUNITIVE NOR THERAPEUTIC; THE SECOND IS A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE WORK OF THOMAS SZASZ, WHOSE CLAIM THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS MENTAL ILLNESS CONFLICTS WITH A CENTRAL ASSUMPTION OF THE ESSAY. THE THIRD ADDENDUM IS A CRITICAL REVIEW OF HERBERT FINGARETT'S 'THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY' -- ONE OF THE FEW ATTEMPTS BY A PHILOSOPHER TO OFFER AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT IT IS TO BE INSANE. THE IMPORTANT CONFLICT BETWEEN THOSE WHO CLAIM THAT GUILT FEELINGS ARE RATIONAL AND THOSE WHO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE NOT IS ADDRESSED IN THE NEXT ESSAY. THE AUTHOR INDICATES HIS OWN RESERVATIONS ABOUT GUILT. AN ESSAY ON SHARED GUILT INVESTIGATES THE TRUTH THAT MAY LIE BEHIND THE VIEW SYMPATHETICALLY PRESENTED BY DOSTOYEVSKY IN 'THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV' THAT 'WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING.' THE LAST EASSAY THAT 'WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING.' THE LAST ESSAY SPRINGBOARD FOR PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY. THE AUTHOR EXAMINES AN OBVIOUSLY SIGNIFICANT HUMAN EXPERIENCE ENTIRELY NEGLECTED BY PHILOSOPHERS AND LEFT BY THEM, WITHOUT EXPLANATION, FOR LITERARY ARTISTS AND THEOLOGIANS. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED).