THE DATA OBTAINED SHOW THAT ROUTINE CAREER CONTINGENCIES REWARD PAROLE OFFICERS FOR UNDERREPORTING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR. THUS, ALL ELSE BEING EQUAL, PAROLE OFFICERS WILL IGNORE MOST OF THE CRIMES, INCIDENTS, AND VIOLATIONS THEY OBSERVE IN THEIR CASELOADS. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE ARE SITUATIONS WHERE THE PAROLE OFFICER REALIZES SOME BENEFIT FROM REPORTING AN INCIDENT. THESE BENEFITS RELATE GENERALLY TO THE CONTROL OF PAROLEES AND TO THE SATISFACTION OF INFORMAL BUREAUCRATIC DEMANDS. ORDINARILY, THE PAROLE OFFICER WILL REPORT AN INCIDENT AND THEREBY CREATE A RECORD ONLY WHEN HE CAN USE THAT RECORD TO ENHANCE HIS WORK ENVIRONMENT. THESE FINDINGS HAVE TWO IMPLICATIONS. FIRST, PAROLE RECORDS DO NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT THE BEHAVIOR OF PAROLEES. A SECOND, MORE IMPORTANT IMPLICATION CONCERNS THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN THE VARIOUS USES OF RECORDS. CAREER CONTINGENCIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ARE SUCH THAT PAROLE OFFICERS ARE REWARDED FOR PRODUCING 'BAD' RECORDS AND PUNISHED FOR PRODUCING 'GOOD' RECORDS. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED.)