THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL, WHICH EXPLAINS ACTION BY LOOKING AT AN ORGANIZATION'S OBJECTIVES, THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL, WHICH VIEWS ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AS A REFLECTION OF A CONSENSUS OF THE DIVERGENT INTERESTS OF SUBGROUPS, AND THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL, WHICH EXAMINES INDIVIDUALS WITHIN EACH SUBGROUP AS ACTORS IN POLITICAL POWER GAMES, ARE EMPLOYED TO DESCRIBE AND INTERPRET COURT ADJUDICATION OF FELONIES. THE STUDY WAS CONDUCTED IN 1967 IN ONE CRIMINAL COURT IN A REPRESENTATIVE LARGE EASTERN CITY. A PERIOD OF OBSERVATION OF THE COURT PRECEDED INTERVIEWS WITH ATTORNEYS AND JUDGES, AND FOUR SUBSEQUENT RANDOM SAMPLING OF CASE FILES TAKEN FROM THE RECORDS KEPT BY THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND FROM THE CLERKS' OFFICE OF THE LOWER AND SUPERIOR COURT. THE SAMPLES INCLUDED 10 OFFENSE CATEGORIES. THE FORMAL PROCEDURAL ORGANIZATION IS OUTLINED, AS IS THE COURT'S DAILY OPERATION AND THE ADJUDICATION OF FELONY CASES. THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL PROVIDES AN EXPLANATION FOR STATISTICAL PATTERNS CONCERNING THE METHOD OF ADJUDICATION AND COURT CASE DISPOSITION. THE ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL EXPLAINS SUBGROUP BEHAVIOR AND CASE OUTCOMES, FOCUSING ON STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AND CASE ASSESSMENTS WHICH EVOLVE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL IS EMPLOYED IN VIEWING THE ROLE OF THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY MANAGEMENT OF CASES AND THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN FAVORABLE DISPOSITIONS FOR CLIENTS. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE CRIMINAL TRIAL HAS BEEN SURPASSED BY PLEA BARGAINING AS THE MOST COMMON METHOD OF ADJUDICATING DEFENDANTS; INFORMAL UNDERSTANDINGS AMONG LEGAL OFFICIALS CREATE AN INFORMAL LEGAL CODE WHICH GUIDES EVERYDAY COURT OPERATIONS. ALSO, IT IS BELIEVED THAT EVIDENCE CONSIDERED IN A CASE MAY HAVE LESS OF A RELATIONSHIP TO CASE DISPOSITION THAN DO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE ATTORNEYS INVOLVED. NOTES ARE PROVIDED AT THE END OF EACH CHAPTER. TABULAR DATA APPEARS THROUGHOUT AND IN THE APPENDIX. AN INDEX IS ALSO INCLUDED. (RCB)